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Abstract. The paper presents a methodology to protect the integrity of multichannel images, having some highly 
redundant channels, by means of a reversible fragile watermarking algorithm. The watermark embedding phase uses a 
lossless compression method to compress the high redundancy channels, stores the compressed stream into their most 
significant bits, then embeds a secret fragile watermark by modifying the least significant bits of the high redundancy 
channels. In case the watermarked image is not modified, the host image can be perfectly reconstructed; otherwise, 
the modified area can be detected and located with very high probability and the area that has not been forged can be 
restored as in the original host image. The embedding of the watermark is performed by a Genetic Algorithm in the 
Karhunen-Loève Transform (KLT) domain: the use of a secret space defined by the KLT guarantees both security of 
the method and a high sensitivity in the detection of the forged areas. 
Keywords: reversible watermarking; fragile watermarking; multichannel image processing; image authentication; 
genetic algorithm; Karhunen-Loève Transform. 
1 Introduction 
Digital data may undergo different kinds of attacks, like malicious modification (i.e. tampering), 
unauthorized copying and copyright infringement. 
In the field of data hiding, digital watermarking (watermarking in the following) is a 
technology that may be used to protect digital contents, like images, videos and sounds, from the 
cited security attacks. 
Basically watermarking embeds a signal  into a digital object  by modifying some parts of 
it. Depending on the objective of the protection, different watermarking algorithms are developed. 
Before describing the properties of a watermarking algorithm we introduce a simple model of 
the whole process. 
The watermarking process is composed by two distinct phases, sequential and non-
overlapping in time. The first one is the embedding phase, which inserts a watermark signal  into 
an object  possibly using a secret key : the output is a watermarked object . The second phase 
is a extraction stage: after receiving  (a possibly altered watermarked object due to intentional 
attacks or to various kinds of transmission or storage errors) it returns the watermark signal present 
 and/or a Boolean value stating if the original watermark is present; this phase, in general, needs 
the secret key  used to embed the watermark and may also require the original image  and 
watermark . 
Watermarking algorithms may be classified according to some properties and characteristics; 
we report the main ones in the following list: 
• reversibility: if the extraction stage may obtain the original host image  from  and 
 (and possibly ) the method is reversible, otherwise it is irreversible; 
• robustness: an algorithm designed to embed a watermark that must resist attacks 
aimed at its removal (like in copyright protection) is said to perform robust 
watermarking; on the converse, if the objective is to detect the minimal modification 
to the object (e.g. for integrity protection) then the algorithm must be designed to 
insert a fragile watermark; 
• blindness: a method that does not need the host object  in the extraction phase is said 
blind, otherwise it is said informed (or non-blind); 
• embedding domain: if the watermark is embedded directly in the data composing the 
object (like pixels for images, or samples for sounds) then the algorithm is said to 
work in the spatial domain or time domain; on the other hand, if the data is firstly 
transformed in another domain like the Fourier Transform domain or the Discrete 
Cosine Transform domain, and the watermark is embedded into the transform 
coefficients, then the algorithm works in the frequency domain; also, other domains 
are possible, like the fractal domain; 
• perceptibility: while the other properties are objective, perceptibility is subjective 
because it is referred to a human judgment: if the degradation due to watermark 
embedding can be seen by an average observer the watermark is called perceptible 
(visible), otherwise it is said imperceptible (invisible); notice that there are algorithms 
that explicitly degrade the object superimposing a signal that makes the object 
unsuitable for any application unless it is removed (like the logos on images to be 
sold), or that insert a logo to identify a property, like ownership of a television 
transmission. 
The proposed algorithm may be applied to multichannel images: it is reversible, fragile and 
blind; moreover, it embeds the watermark in a secret frequency domain defined by the Karhunen-
Loève Transform. The high redundancy channels undergo a visible degradation due to the 
compression step, but they can be reversibly restored. The main properties of the algorithms are: 
• image tampering detection: the algorithm verifies the integrity of the image and 
signals with very high probability any modification it has undergone; 
• localization: any tampering is localized at block (i.e. subimage) level; 
• reversibility: any image that has not been tampered may be restored to the original 
form it had before watermark embedding; 
• security: due to the use of a secret space for watermark embedding and to the 
information stored into the watermark, the algorithm is secure against intentional and 
unintentional attacks. 
The paper is structured into seven sections: following this introduction, the next one recalls 
the scientific papers dealing with the subject of the present research; then, a background section 
presents the main concepts used in the development of the algorithm, which is presented in the 
fourth section. A set of experiments proving the feasibility and capabilities of the method are shown 
in section 5. Section 6 discusses the security of the algorithm and finally some observations and 
conclusions are drawn in section 7. 
2 Related works 
Works on watermarking of multichannel images have been mainly oriented to RGB color images, 
eventually also considering the -channel. Algorithms for robust and fragile watermarking have 
been developed both in the spatial and in the frequency (transformed) domains: in the following of 
this section, we will firstly review some approaches and then we will describe some reversible 
watermarking schemes. Generally, we noted that it is somewhat difficult to make comparisons 
amongst and with these approaches due to the different features and characteristics, like localization 
capability, reversibility or embedding channels (e.g., RGB channels or -channel only). 
An interesting work on reversible data embedding in the spatial domain was proposed by Tian 
[23]: pairs of pixels are considered for carrying one bit of information, with the drawback to take 
into account the possible overflow and thus the need of a location map for storing the modified 
pairs positions. Alattar [0] improves the embedding capacity and efficiency of [23] by considering 
vectors of pixels instead of pairs. 
[15] develops a data hiding method by considering the difference histogram of neighboring 
pixels: bits are embedded into pixels whose difference with the contiguous one is the most frequent 
(difference histogram shifting); overflow is dealt with the use of thresholds, under the assumption 
of low gradient gray level images. 
In [17] a framework for applying reversible data embedding to fragile watermarking is 
developed. The work divides an image into tamper localization blocks and shows how to embed in 
these blocks a secure hash (apparently used with a key, thus properly a message authentication 
code) using any reversible data embedding algorithm; moreover, it uses the idea of merging blocks 
in case a single block is not able to completely carry a hash. 
The algorithm presented in [6] embeds in the pixels integer values in the range 1, ; it 
classifies pixels in three sets: the embedding ones, those that cannot carry information (called to-
correct), and the original ones that allow a correct decoding of the data stream. Embedding and 
decoding are performed in two passes, and the algorithm is capable, for well-behaved images, to 
reach 2 bit per pixel payloads. 
An elegant solution to fragile watermarking of images in the spatial domain has been 
developed in [14] and revised in [4]: the method non-reversibly watermarks image blocks and 
produces images with a high Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR) with some constraints on the 
block size; it is proposed for grayscale images but can be adapted to multichannel images as done in 
[5]. 
Embedding authentication information in the -channel is applied in [3]: from an RGB image 
a completely transparent -channel is added; then, the 2 LSB planes of this channel are zeroed and 
a Message Authentication Code (MAC) is computed for every image block; the MAC is XOR-ed 
with a watermark string and the resulting bits are stored in the -channel LSBs. The use of the 
LSBs allows for a minimal impact on the Human Visual System. 
In the work [12] the authentication information with self-repair capability is embedded into a 
newly added -channel of a grayscale image: to minimize the alteration of the transparency the 
watermark is stored modifying -values near the maximum of their range. This algorithm is 
extended and applied in [13] to color images, adding an -channel to an RGB image embedding 
therein the authentication information (made of strings computed with the Shamir secret sharing 
algorithm). 
In the frequency domain watermarking, one of the mostly used transform is the Discrete 
Cosine Transform (DCT). In [20] the DCT is used to compact the energy of a block and to generate 
part of a watermark: the DCT is applied for integrity protection and recovery of the tampered areas. 
In [28] the DCT is combined with fractal compression to embed a fragile watermark along with 
recovery information. 
The Singular Value Decomposition is applied in [18] to authenticate image blocks: the 
singular values of the image blocks are used to compute authentication information which is 
successively used to modify the LSBs of the pixels along with secret keys to scramble data. 
Genetic algorithms have been used in the context of image watermarking for minimizing 
distortion, as in [24] where the watermark is embedded in the spatial domain, or to cope with and 
correct the watermark string modification induced by pixel value integer rounding after watermark 
embedding in the DCT domain [2]. 
3 Background 
This section is devoted to recall the main concepts used in the following sections with the objective 
of making the paper self-contained. Nonetheless, we report references to give pointers for an in-
depth analysis and to perform a detailed study of the tools used by the proposed algorithm. 3.1 Channel	redundancy	
The algorithm requires that ≥ 1 channels of an -channel ( ≥ ) image have a certain amount 
of redundancy. In particular, the objective is to exploit this redundancy to compress the pixel values 
in these  channels to create an area that may be used to embed the watermark. In the verification 
phase, after the watermark extraction, the  channels may be restored to their original values, 
making the method completely reversible. 
Every channel is divided into blocks of equal size and compressed at the pixel level, one 
block independently from the others; block independency allows for the tamper localization and 
block reversibility of the algorithm: even if a block is tampered and damaged, all other non-
tampered blocks can be reversibly reconstructed. 
In the present embodiment the embedding algorithm changes the LSB plane of a block in a 
channel, thus for images having  bit per channel per pixel the redundancy required must allow a 
compression ratio of at least = − 1⁄ . An image channel for which ≥  holds for 
every block is called High Redundancy Channel (HRC), otherwise it is called Low Redundancy 
Channel (LRC). 3.2 The	compression	algorithm	
We designed the compression of the HRCs to work locally for every block: the locality avoids that 
an attack modifying an area in the HRCs propagates to untouched areas nullifying the localization 
ability of the algorithm. 
The pixels in a block are linearized using a raster scan order, one HRC after the other. Then, 
using a simple prediction method, the differences between a pixel value and the previous one are 
encoded with a given Huffman table (in a similar fashion to lossless JPEG or lossless PNG), the 
latter computed on a set of images and kept fixed and publicly available. The computational 
complexity of this procedure is linear in the number of pixels. 
The first pixel of the first HRC channel of every block is preceded by a virtual pixel having 
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Given a vector ∈  its KLT is computed as = − ; it is possible to perform the 
inverse transformation KLT‒1 with = + . The elements  of  are called coefficients of 
the transform and a coefficient’s position  in  is called order. 
In the proposed algorithm, the watermark bits will be encoded in the binary representation of 
KLT coefficients, so that a coefficient  carries a bit  in position  if and only if: = ℰ , 	# 1  
where ℰ y , α = 	2 	mod		2 and  is the floor function. 
To embed a bit string  of length  bits into a vector  the following must be defined: 
• a fixed sequence of  coefficients’ orders , , ..., , where ≥ ; 
• a bit position ; 
• a function ℬ ∶ 	 0,1 → 0,1 . 
Then, applying slight modifications to the elements of , a vector  is sought such that it 
holds 
• = − , and 
• = ℬ ℰ , , ℰ , , … , ℰ , 	 . 
Previous studies [5] analyzed the influence of the parameters ,  and ℬ on the final resulting 
image; in particular, the different tested ℬ functions were direct mapping (used here), syndrome 
coding and modulo sum of coefficients [5]. 
The KLT is used to define a secret embedding space: in our setting the use of a secret image 
pixel values as vectors of an -dimensional space  from which to derive the kernel  is a way to 
build a compact representation of a secret symmetric key. 3.5 Genetic	Algorithms	
A genetic algorithm (GA) is a computing paradigm that evolves representations of solutions to an 
optimization problem with the objective of finding an optimal solution. 
When the representation of a problem may be coded as an ordered set of parameters ⋯  and it is possible to express with a function the degree of fitness of a sequence of values 
to the optimum then a GA may be used to evolve a set of candidates that approximate the desired 
solution. 
A GA starts from a population of individuals, each one encoding a possible solution and 
initialized with random values. 
The population is evolved through generations until an individual coding a viable solution is 
found (or a maximum number of generations is reached): in every generation the individuals are 
evaluated with a fitness function and are reproduced by means of operators and rules to build a new 
population. 
In general, three operators are considered to reproduce individuals: 
• selection: pairs of individuals are chosen from the actual population  and the one 
with best fitness in each pair is saved in a set ; 
• crossover: pairs of individuals ⋯  and ⋯  in  are considered for 
mating; with probability  the two individuals exchange their parameters: in one 
point crossover an integer random number , 1 < < , is generated and the new 
offsprings ⋯ ⋯  and ⋯ ⋯  are created, in two point 
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Fig. 4 Block splitting of a multichannel host image: the pixels in the  HRCs channel can be modified to 
carry the watermark, while the pixels in the  LRCs channels will not be changed by the embedding 
algorithm. 4.2 Secret	KLT	basis	computation	using	 	
The computation of a secret KLT basis may be performed once for every secret key image , as 
long as the number of channels  of the host image(s) to be watermarked is known. After that, the 
same KLT basis may be applied to watermark any number of images with 	  channels. The 
computational complexity of this step is the one of the algorithm used to compute the eigenvectors 
and eigenvalues of a symmetric matrix. 
The key image may be single channel or multichannel: to generate a set of samples, non-
overlapping groups of  contiguous pixels are built. Then, the method described in the previous 
subsection 3.4 is used to produce a mean vector  and a kernel matrix  composed of  
eigenvectors having  components. 4.3 High	Redundancy	Channels	pre‐embedding	
A pre-embedding phase applied to  saves the information required to make the method reversible. 
In particular, the  HRCs are compressed in a lossless way (as presented in subsection 3.2), every 
block independently from the others, and the resulting compressed stream stored in the MSBs of the 
 redundant channels. By means of this operation we can save space and allow for the LSBs of the 
 channels to be used in the fragile watermark embedding. 
As previously stated, the compressed stream is stored starting from the less significant MSBs 
leaving untouched the high order MSBs, i.e. first filling bit 1, then bit 2, then 3, and so on till bit 7 
of the MSBs. Should the compressed stream be much shorter than the available space, this 
constraint may be relaxed, and one can start from bit 2 or bit 3 of the MSBs, so leaving more space 
for the watermark embedding. 
The decoding of the compressed stream may be performed unambiguously, provided that the 
stream starts at a fixed position and the decoding table is known, as it is in our case. 
The computational complexity of this step is linear in the number of blocks. 
After the compressed stream has been stored in the MSBs of the  channels blocks, a 
watermark embedding phase similar to the one proposed in [5] is performed, using the image  
resulting from the pre-embedding process as host image. 4.4 Authentication	string	generation	
The proposed algorithm embeds an authentication bit string  computed from  and . In this way 
different images will have different watermarks embedded (with the limits discussed below) with 
the aim of increasing security and protecting against transplantation and copy-and-paste attacks. 
The string  is generated by using SHA-3† (in its version for arbitrary output length SHAKE [7]) 
applied to a key obtained concatenating the following data: 
• dimensions of the image (height , width , number of channels ), to protect also 
against image cropping and channel removal; 
• a sequence  of pixel values in  whose coordinates are determined as follows: we 
use the values of a sequence of pixels in fixed (and publicly known) positions in  as 
indexes to select a sequence of pixels values  of  (in the LRCs, not modified nor 
compressed by our algorithm) which in turn are used as indexes to determine the 
sequence . 
Given the secrecy of  it is unfeasible for an attacker to derive . 4.5 Watermark	string	generation	
The watermark string  carries two types of information, namely an authentication bit string  and 
a classification bit string . 
1) The authentication bit string  is generated according to the method presented in 
subsection 4.4. 
2) The classification bit string  specifying which channels are HRCs (1s) and which are 
LRCs (0s): these data consist of  bits (where  is the number of channels). For 
example, an image with 4 channels (RGB ) that has a highly redundant -channel 
will have the bit string 0001 as classification bit string . These classification bits will 
allow to determine which are the HRCs and LRCs channels in the restoration phase. 
If the payload is  bits-per-subimage (bps) then the length of  will be ⁄ ; for every 
block, − 1 bits are consecutively taken from  and one bit is derived from : this means that for 
an ×  image with blocks of size ×  the required length of  will be − 1 ⁄  bits 
and the  classification bits in  will be completely repeated  times and correspondingly 
embedded in the image (for block size = 10  and images of size 512 × 512 × 4 , we have = 655). 
For example, suppose a payload of 6 bps, an authentication bit string = 00110	11001	11000	00010	10000	01100	11111	10101…. 
and a classification bit string = . Then, the string  will be 00110 	11001 	11000 	00010 	10000 	01100 	11111 	10101 …. 
                                                            
† The computational complexity of this step depends on the complexity of the SHA-3 algorithm. 
4.6 Watermark	embedding	
After a KLT basis of  vectors is derived from the secret key image  and a watermark string  
is computed, consecutive parts of , each one of  bits, are embedded into the subimages ×  
(examined in raster scan order) by the GA. 
For every subimage of , the GA embeds the  bits by modifying the subimage HRCs LSBs. 
More precisely, the GA evolves a population where every individual represents a bit string used to 
substitute the subimage available LSBs (after the HRCs compression). The new subimage is KLT 
transformed and from  (fixed) coefficients  bits  are extracted: if they coincide with those to be 
embedded, then the new subimage substitutes the original one in  to obtain, when all the 
subimages have been examined, the final watermarked image . The evolution of the population is 
concluded when the  bits are embedded into the subimage or a maximum number of generations 
has been reached: in the latter case the image is declared non-watermarkable or a new population is 
created for a new attempt to embed the bits in the subimage. 
The GA fitness function measures the Hamming distance between the bit string stored in the 
KLT coefficients and the bits of  pertaining to the subimage under examination, and the GA 
requires this distance to be equal to 0 for a viable block. No other quality measures are considered, 
like Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR), because the reversibility of the method allows to obtain 
the original channels: in fact, the GA may modify only the LSBs of the HRCs to embed the relevant 
part of  into the KLT coefficients of the subimage transform. In this way, in case a subimage is not 
modified by an attack it can be completely restored to its original values, making the method 
reversible. 
When the GA has embedded the secret watermark string  into all the image subimages, the 
watermarked image  may be released in the public: its low redundancy channels will result 
untouched by the algorithm, whilst the HRCs will be altered with the property of being possibly 
restored by anyone to their original status if no attacks have been performed. Nonetheless, only the 
holder of  can check the integrity of the various subimages. 
A high level scheme of the algorithm is reported in Algorithm 1 depicted in Fig. 5. The 
computational complexity of this step depends on the compression algorithm, as previously 
discussed, and the embedding has a complexity that is linear in the number of subimages; moreover, 
the computational load for every subimage depends on the parameter configuration of the GA 
algorithm used. In the current implementation, the GA runs for a maximum number of generations 
(2000), but it usually finds a solution in 25 − 35  generations on average. Anyway, the total 
running time is upper bounded by ⁄ ,where  is the maximum running time of the GA. 
Algorithm 1: 
Input:  image to watermark 
   secret key image 
Output:  watermarked image 
compute KLT basis from  
split  into subimages according to block size 
select HRCs and LRCs: for every channel 
compress all subimages 
if (all subimages of a channel satisfy 
the compression ratio condition) 
then mark it as an HRC 
compress and pre-embed the pixel values of the HRCs and obtain  
compute the authentication string  using  and  LRCs 
generate the classification string  
interleave  and  to build the watermark  
for every subimage 
embed corresponding  part into subimage using the GA (GA_embedding) 




generate population of random individuals coding HRCs LSBs 
for maxnumgenerations 
evaluate all individuals: if (one individual has fitness=0) 
then return success and 
subimage having the 





compute and return Hamming distance between 
 part and ℬ ℰ , , ℰ , , … , ℰ , 	  
Fig. 5 Pseudo code of the fragile watermark embedding procedure. 
4.7 Watermark	extraction,	verification	and	image	restoration	
The verification/restoration phase works as follows (see Fig. 3). 
Firstly, every subimage in  is transformed with the KLT (using the basis derived from ) 
and the embedded watermark  is extracted. From  the authentication string  and the 
classification string  are demultiplexed. In case of no attacks the  copies of the  bit string 
classifying the channels will be identical, but if any subimage has been tampered there will be some 
differing string(s). To determine the HRC-LRC distribution the most frequent string will be chosen 
as the correct classification (as discussed in section 6, a wrongly decoded string will not expose any 
security breach). 
After that, the watermark string  that should be found embedded is generated using the 
HRCs of the watermarked image  and the secret key . 
Thirdly, a comparison performing the XOR operation ℛ = ⊕  leads a resulting 
string that has ones (‘1’) corresponding to altered subimages. 
If the part (having length  bits) of ℛ corresponding to a subimage is all 0s the subimage is 
considered intact and the HRCs are restored decompressing the stream in the MSBs, otherwise the 
subimage is marked as forged. So, the subimage is the minimum forge localization area, i.e. image 
modifications are signaled to the user by marking the whole subimage containing the forged pixels. 
A high level scheme of the verification and restoration Algorithm 2 is reported in Fig. 6. The 
computational complexity of the verification and reversible phase is linear in the number of 
subimages. 
Algorithm 2: 
Input:  possibly watermarked image 
   secret key image 
Output:  verified and restored image 
compute KLT basis from  
split  into subimages according to block size 
for every subimage  
extract  with KLT-1 and function ℬ 
select HRCs and LRCs from ⊂  
compute watermark string  using  and  LRCs 
for every subimage  
if ( = ) 
then decompress subimage HRCs and restore subimage in  
else mark subimage as forged in  
return  
Fig. 6 Pseudo code of the fragile watermark verification and restoration procedure. 
5 Experimental results 
This section summarizes the results of a large number of experiments we executed to test the 
performance of the proposed algorithm: we applied the reversible fragile watermarking algorithm to 
a set of images with at least one HRC. 
We considered three objective parameters, namely the sensitivity, the Mean Absolute Error 
(MAE) and the Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR). Among them, we consider the sensitivity the 
most important, given that the reversibility property of the algorithm allows the authorized user to 
obtain the original host image as final result. Indeed, the sensitivity‡  gives a measure of the 
capability of the algorithm to detect tampering attacks. 
Thus, the meanings of the parameters used to measure the performance of the proposed 
algorithm are: 
• Sensitivity (as in [5]): the sensitivity of level  is defined as the fraction of blocks that are 
detected as tampered in the verification phase when just one pixel per block is modified by 
 levels; 
• Mean Absolute Error (MAE): measures the average absolute difference between pixels of 
the host and the watermarked images; 
• Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR): this classical objective quality measure is defined as 
                                                            
‡ We designed an experimental setting in which we test how many times the verifier misses a tampered subimage 
when a single pixel of that subimage is changed by just 1 or 2 grey levels. This is actually the smallest tampering an 
attacker can perform: any other attack, such as filtering, blurring, noise addition, copy-and-paste, cropping, etc., would 
modify more pixels and, very likely, of more than just 1 grey level. 
PSNR = 10	log  
where  is the maximum intensity level of each channel (i.e., for 8 bit images it is 2 − 1 = 255 ) and  represents the mean squared error between the host and the 
watermarked images. 
We chose a setting for the genetic algorithm to be used in all experiments; in particular, we 
derived the setting values from many experiments devised to have fast convergence to a solution 
resulting in a high quality image. The settings were population size = 100, = 0.9, = 0.06, 
maximum generations = 2000. 
The first set of tests were performed on a public collection of images (from the Telegram 
application [21, 22]); the 29 images are in PNG RGB  (RGB with alpha channel) format: the alpha 
channel is not trivial (in the sense that it varies on the whole image to follow the sticker shape) and 
we expected it to be a HRC. Table 1 reports the watermarking results for two different values of 
payload; the PSNR is influenced only by the differences induced by the HRC, as the process does 
not alter any LRC pixel. 
In the presented tests the block size was set to = 11 (i.e. the subimages were composed of 11 × 11 four channel pixels). We also conducted tests with smaller values for , but for some 
images no channel was an HRC, so we selected the smallest value for which we could compress 
enough every block. 













8 86.79±2.83 96.61±0.98 0.6056±0.1544 36.54±3.54 46.77±8.18 26 
10 89.23±1.07 96.81±1.14 0.6171±0.1541 36.52±3.52 59.78±11.39 32 
We compared our algorithm with the ones proposed in [13] and [20], that have been showed 
superior against other approaches ([11], [16] and [19], [25], [26], [27] respectively). One of the 
settings of [13] is RGB image authentication, which is performed by adding an alpha channel where 
every pixel stores three authentication bits derived from the corresponding RGB channel values 
(scrambled with a key) using a secret sharing method: the effect is that every alpha channel pixel 
contains the sum of 248  and the authenticating value; moreover, the authentication data is 
distributed among groups of three pixels each, making each group the smallest forge localization 
unit. 
Our algorithm, instead, works on any existing HRC channels, thus having a wider range of 
applications to images of any kind; the disadvantage w.r.t. [13] is the bigger authentication block 
size. 
In [20], Singh et al. described a fragile watermarking algorithm for RGB color images with 
restoration capabilities of tampered areas, whereas our proposed algorithm only restore untampered 
blocks but works with any multichannel image. 
The images for the comparison reported in Table 2 were obtained by the classical ones (as the 
names recall) of size 512 × 512  pixels adding an extra HRC channel completely opaque (i.e. 
having pixel values equal to 255), as done in [13]. 
From Table 2 it may be observed that the MAEs computed on the HRC (i.e. the alpha 
channel) computed by our algorithm are an order of magnitude lower than those in [13]. Moreover, 
the PSNR is much greater than that reported in [20] on the same set of images. 
Table 2 Comparison of MAE and PSNR values for some images. 
Image MAE  PSNR 
 [13] Proposed algorithm [20] Proposed algorithm 
Baboon 0.723 0.0192 39.55 65.26 
Lena 0.720 0.0190 39.79 65.29 
F-16 0.721 0.0191 - 65.25 
Tiffany 0.721 0.0194 - 65.30 
Boat - 0.0191 39.93 65.33 
House - 0.0190 39.16 65.33 
Pepper - 0.0194 40.19 65.26 
Woman - 0.0194 39.73 65.25 
Extending the test in Table 2 to a larger set of images (500 color images) we obtained an 
average MAE value of 0.0336 ± 0.0003 and an average PSNR value of 62.86 ± 0.037 confirming 
the high quality of the watermarked images; moreover, the standard deviation of the resulting 
MAEs and PSNRs is very low and confirms that the algorithm is stable and is not influenced by the 
image content. 
As an example of the resulting whole authentication process, we present in Fig. 7 an image (a) 
to show the result from the watermarking process (b) and how the proposed algorithm detects (d) 
the modifications made in (c): as the HRCs are the blue and alpha channels of this image, it is 
impossible to notice any difference between host and watermarked images; on the other hand, the 
image is restored to its original state (d) apart from the tampered blocks in the upper-right part of 
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localization is possible (anyway the modification is detected and the image declared altered): for 
this reason we suggest to keep small the set  of pixels used to create the watermark (typically four 
pixels). 
A feature of the method is its public reversibility: anyone may reconstruct an image from  
because the compression/decompression algorithm and Huffman table for the HRCs are public. 
Nonetheless, only the watermark embedder has the capability to know if any modification to  has 
been performed and which subimages have been forged. Thus, the possibility to reversibly 
reconstruct the original host image left to anyone is only apparent and poses no security problems, 
in fact: 
• without the key image  it is not possible to test if the watermarked image is intact or 
has been forged, so the reconstruction of  is possible only for the watermark 
embedder; 
• anyway, knowledge of  does not disclose any critical information because the 
objective of a fragile watermarking algorithm is to verify the integrity of objects, not 
hide their content. 
Another consideration that is important is that when embedding  watermark bps there is a 
probability of 1 2⁄  that a random subimage substitution goes undetected. Obviously, the 
probability that  different forged subimages are all undetected is 1 2⁄ , which drops dramatically 
even for small values of  and . 
As shown in section 5, the main factor to take into account for the applicability of the method 
is the sensitivity to single pixel-single intensity level modifications: as shown, the proposed 
algorithm is very sensible to these modifications with a high probability of detecting this kind of 
little tampering, which translates in a strong sensitivity to forgery and a high capability of 
localization. 
7 Discussion and conclusions 
In this paper a reversible method for fragile watermarking multichannel images has been presented 
and discussed: the requirement is for the image to possess one, or more than one, high redundancy 
channels. 
The resulting watermarked image has the low redundancy channels untouched, and contains a 
compressed version of its HRCs allowing for a complete restoration of the original host image. 
The owner of the secret key image can verify the integrity of the image. Everyone is able to 
restore an image, but only the secret key owner has the certainty of its integrity. 
The test performed on a large set of images has shown the high sensitivity of the algorithm to 
attacks and the ability to localize them. 
To summarize, the method has the following properties: 
• reversibility; 
• low redundancy channels do not need restoration, as they are untouched (nonetheless, 
they may obviously be forged by an attacker); 
• high sensitivity to modifications; 
• fast image integrity verification and tamper localization ability; 
• applicable to any uncompressed, or lossless compressed, image file formats. 
The proposed algorithm fits in the MIMIC framework [5], adding a pre-embedding and a 
decompression module, along with slight modifications for the management of the HRC-LRC 
classification. 
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